A follow-up on friendship, polyamory, and nomenclature: “Recognizing Care: The Case for Friendship and Polyamory,” Syracuse Law and Civic Engagement 1:1 (2014).
A follow-up on the elderly and the index problem: “Fair Care: Eldercare and Distributive Justice,” Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, OnlineFirst 8/31/15: 1-20.
Three shorter pieces:
- “Why can’t we be (legally recognized) friends?,” theForum (LSE), September 2015.
- “Philosophers on the Supreme Court’s Gay Marriage Ruling,” Daily Nous, June 29, 2015.
- “Just Care: What Society Owes the Elderly,” Philosop-her, January 16, 2015.
An overview of Minimizing Marriage
Even in secular contexts, marriage retains sacramental connotations. Yet what is its moral significance? This book examines its morally salient features – promise, commitment, care, and contract – with surprising results. In Part One, “De-Moralizing Marriage,” essays on promise and commitment argue that we cannot promise to love and so wedding vows are (mostly) failed promises, and that marriage may be a poor commitment strategy. The book contends with the most influential philosophical accounts of the moral value of marriage to argue that it has no inherent moral significance. Further, the special value accorded marriage sustains amatonormative discrimination – discrimination against non-amorous or non-exclusive caring relationships such as friendships, adult care networks, polyamorous groups, or urban tribes. The discussion raises issues of independent interest for the moral philosopher such as the possibilities and bounds of interpersonal moral obligations and the nature of commitment.
The central argument of Part Two, “Democratizing Marriage,” is that liberal reasons for recognizing same-sex marriage also require recognizing groups, polyamorists, polygamists, friends, urban tribes, and adult care networks. Political liberalism requires the disestablishment of monogamous amatonormative marriage. Under the constraints of public reason, a liberal state must refrain from basing law solely on moral or religious doctrines; but only such doctrines could furnish reason for restricting marriage to male-female couples or romantic love dyads. Restrictions on marriage should thus be minimized. But public reason can provide a strong rationale for minimal marriage: care, and social supports for care, are a matter of fundamental justice. Part Two also responds to challenges posed by property division on divorce, polygyny, and supporting parenting, and builds on critiques of marriage drawn from feminism, queer theory, and race theory. It argues, using the example of minimal marriage, that liberalism has unexplored potential for feminist reform.
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Ethics, Hypatia, Humana Mente – International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Philosophy in Review, Reason, Res Publica, Social Theory and Practice, Journal of Applied Philosophy, The Philosopher’s Magazine, Journal of Homosexuality, APhEx Portale Italiano di Filosofia Analitica Giornale di Filosofia.
“Is Marriage a Fraud?,” interview with Anjana Vaswani, Mumbai Mirror, July 26, 2012 (also printed in The Times of India).
“Should Marriage be Abolished, Minimized, or Left Alone?,” Bella dePaulo, Psychology Today, July 17, 2012.
“Il matrimonio? Meglio minimo,” Giuliano Torrengo and Vera Tripodi, Il Sole 24 Ore (Italy), June 10, 2012.
Daily Xtra (Vancouver), “What Colin Firth Shows about Metaphysics of Love,” Niko Bell, http://dailyxtra.com/news/colin-firth-shows-metaphysics-love-100557, March 2015
Discussed on TVO (TV Ontario) show, “The Agenda with Steve Paikin,” http://tvo.org/video/210839/all-you-need-lovehttp://tvo.org/video/210839/all-you-need-love